Introductory waffle
This is very much a work-in-progress blog post, written in a
bit of a rush. I hope to edit it ‘sometime’ to make it more clear, readable,
and engaging, especially for non psychology students. This blog post spans
content covered in two consecutive weeks of my altruism module: “Mind-reading
and morality” and “Passion and emotion”.
“Mind-reading and morality” considers the role of
understanding in caring about the positive welfare of others (called “altruism”
on the module and in this blog). Such understanding has two (or three) components:
understanding others’ specific experiences or situations and understanding others-as-individuals-worthy-of-concern.
“Passion and emotion” considers the role of emotions in
caring about the positive welfare of others; both as potential causes of
altruism (e.g., guilt, gratitude, etc.) and as potential manifestations of
altruism (e.g., pity, sympathy, compassion, etc.).
Many of these topics will merit its own blog post in time,
fate willing. In this one I focus on yet another term that is routinely used in
a way that impedes rather than promotes understanding and progress: “empathy”.
What is empathy?
Adopting my now-standard practice of trying to delineate
distinct phenomena rather than make claims about what empathy “is” or “really
means”, here is a list of what might be argued to be its main aspects, building
blocks, or types:
1.
Other-understanding, i.e., having beliefs
about another’s experience or situation.
These can vary in how accurate they are (a.k.a. “empathic accuracy”).
1b. The processes used in reaching other-understanding are often also
referred to as aspects of “empathy” but are probably better referred to as
methods of attempted mind-reading.
2.
Contagion, i.e., having experiences
that are triggered by and similar to another’s experience. Most commonly
this is discussed in terms of “sharing” another’s emotional experience, e.g., being
distressed because another is distressed (a.k.a. “empathic distress”) or joyful
because they are joyful (a.k.a. “empathic joy”).
3.
Consideration, i.e., behaving
in ways that suggest concern for another’s positive welfare; “showing”
or “demonstrating” empathy. From my point of view, a manifestation of altruism.
Because these seem to be distinguishable phenomena, it would
seem wise to call them different things. This is true even if they are related.
Indeed, it is especially true because they are sometimes related. If we
want to understand the causes, correlates, and consequences of each of these
things, and the relationships among them, it really cannot help to use the term
“empathy” willy-nilly for each or any of them.
Potential determinants of empathy
By which I mean things that may sometimes lead to one or
more of: other-understanding, contagion, or consideration. Confusingly, if
unsurprisingly, each of these potential determinants is also regularly if
erratically referred to using the term “empathy”. For example:
Perspective-taking, i.e.,
trying to imagine what another person is experiencing, what one would be
experiencing were one in another’s situation, or both. Perspective-taking can
be fostered by other processes that are themselves sometimes called “empathy”,
e.g., identification (feeling an association or affiliation with another
because of perceived or fantasized similarity).
Mimicking, i.e., copying
something about someone else, e.g., their posture.
Projecting, i.e., the act
of imputing characteristics to others rather than genuinely perceiving such
characteristics in them. This may result from expectations, desires, or both. Having “put them there”, it is easy for people
to then reach beliefs that they are there.
Attention to another,
e.g., their expressions, posture, self-reports, etc.
Again, understanding the unique and common causes,
correlates, and consequences of other-understanding, contagion, and
consideration is unlikely to be helped by promiscuously and indiscriminately
calling all three of them and potential determinants of one or more of
them “empathy”.
When the title or abstract of a scientific article reports
some discovery concerning “empathy”, I genuinely have only a hazy and tentative
notion of what that article is likely to be about. It might be about almost
anything between a dispositional tendency to be concerned about the positive
welfare of others (i.e., trait altruism) to an ability to spot which of four
facial expressions is registering disgust (i.e., accurate emotion recognition).
That can’t make for good science.
Empathy in the Empathy Altruism Hypothesis
The longer I teach about the Empathy Altruism Hypothesis
(EAH), the more I am reminded of the witticism that the Holy Roman Empire was
not holy, Roman, or an empire.
I have previously suggested that the “altruism” discussed in the EAH (i.e., a qualitatively distinct form of motivation in which pursuit of personal goals plays no essential part) is a chimera. Nevertheless, “empathy” as discussed
in the EAH does sometimes seem to promote altruistic helping as the term is
used here, i.e. helping motivated by concern for the positive welfare of
another.
It therefore becomes important to be clear about what sort
of empathy that is. Again, I have discussed this previously. To recap, it is the experience of a set
of emotions: compassion, sympathy, tenderness, warmth, softheartedness, and
feeling moved. Batson notes that others prefer to label this collection of
emotions with one of the emotions within the collection, e.g., compassion or
sympathy. I am one of those others.
So, the EAH predicts that when we feel compassionate or
sympathetic towards others we will
sometimes try to help them.(1)
I have absolutely no issue with this. Surely only someone confused by jargon
could possibly object!
This does not mean that that any
alleged type of empathy promotes altruism. Only that compassionate emotions
can. If you want to claim that some other alleged type of empathy also promotes
altruism, you need to provide some evidence about that specific
relationship. (Some of the EAH literature will help justify some such claims,
e.g., claims about links between other-understanding and sympathy.)
(1) Mainly when our help seems necessary and sufficient to improve their
welfare and we are not overwhelmed by contrary concerns.
Other-understanding and consideration don’t entail contagion
(Alternative sub-title: Empathy is not necessarily empathic)
It seems possible to understand something about others’
situations and strive to make things to be better for them without sharing their
feelings. Surgeons can understand that anesthetised patients they care about
will benefit tremendously from a well-executed operation and therefore be motivated
to be as effective as possible in helping them. Their other-understanding and
consideration seem unlikely to result from or even to be accompanied by them “catching”
their patients’ feelings. Hopefully, their patients temporarily have no
feelings at all!
Similarly, and to reiterate a point I have made in an earlier post, humans can feel compassion and
concern for people who are currently quite happy (because we know and they do
not that they are in peril) and for wholly imaginary entities (e.g., fictional characters,
cartoon characters, characters represented by video game avatars, etc.).
So, whatever alleged empathy you may be considering, if you
want to make claims that it is the result of emotional contagion or similar,
please provide evidence beyond “It’s empathy, in’it?” This includes claims
about empathy in the EAH.
Against Paul Bloom
Paul Bloom has taken a public stance “Against Empathy”. He recognises that his position is “outlandish” and hastens to be
clear that he is not against “morality, compassion, kindness, love…” and nor he
opposed to other-understanding or to promoting others’ welfare. He is only against
(certain instances of) people “experiencing the world as others [apparently] do”.
Broadly, he is against emotional contagion (in some situations).
I have various complaints about Bloom’s article and
associated stance. One main complaint is that Bloom repeatedly uses the term
“empathy” loosely, inconsistently, and expediently. The other is that this
unhelpful provocativeness is beneath Bloom. Paul Bloom is a very fine scholar,
scientist, writer, and raconteur who is engaged here in a project that makes
scholarship, science, and perhaps even morality harder than it would be had
he not gone down and remained so committed to this path. (See also my comment
below his article.) You wanted a nemesis, Professor Bloom :-)
Mirror neurons and empathy
A detailed discussion of mirror neurons will have to wait.
The standard story is that when humans and some other animals witness another
experiencing something, they and those they are witnessing experience something
very similar. We wince if we see someone bang their thumb with a hammer. We
feel a certain sadness when we see others who appear to be sad. Therefore, the
story goes, we are “naturally empathic”. Contagion happens automatically and,
according to some versions of the story anyway, other-understanding and
consideration/ compassion/ altruism follow almost equally automatically.
If you want to tell a story a bit like this, you will do
well to evaluate the evidence and don’t believe the hype.
In particular, give some consideration to: findings that people unable to
experience pain can recognise (but not “share”) others’ pain; the fact
that Charlotte Willis taught me how horses express emotions; psychopaths
seem unbothered by others’ distress; sports fans revelling in their opponents’
woes; people being insensitive to the misery portrayed in TV news programmes; how
glorious Schadefruede and revenge can feel; and Jarrett (2013).
Summary
The term “empathy”, like the term “altruism, is used so
promiscuously that it can impede clear thinking and scientific progress. When wondering
about where empathy comes from or what results from it, one’s first question
has to be, ‘What might be meant by “empathy”?’ When discussing empathy, one’s
first responsibility is to be as clear as possible about what ‘aspect(s)’ of
empathy you mean. The research literature is stuffed with nuggets about
relationships between mind-reading, other-understanding, contagion, and
altruism, but synthesising that literature will remain a challenge until some
terminological norms take hold. I will nevertheless attempt to review many such
relationships in later posts.
Further reading
Batson, C. D.
(1990). How social an animal? The human capacity for caring. American
Psychologist, 45 (3),
336-346.
Batson, C.D.
(2009). These things called empathy: Eight related but distinct phenomena. In
J. Decety & W. Ickes (Eds.), The
social neuroscience of empathy (pp. 3-15). Cambridge: MIT press. [link]
Decety,
J., & Cowell, J. M. (2014). The complex relation between morality and
empathy. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 18(7), 337-339.
Jarrett, C.
(2013, Dec 13). A calm look at the most hyped concept in neuroscience - Mirror
neurons. Wired. [Link]
Kerem, E.,
Fishman, N., & Josselson, R. (2001). The experience of empathy in everyday
relationships: Cognitive and affective elements. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 18, 709-729
Zaki, J.,
& Ochsner, K. (2012). The neuroscience of empathy: Progress, pitfalls, and
promise. Nature Neuroscience, 15 (5), 675-680.
Videos
One really good: What is empathy?
One that students love but which gets my goat: The power of empathy
Picture credits
Canine empathy [Link]
Helping the handless [Link]
Nemesis [Link]
Sad smiley [Link]
How to cite this
blog post using APA Style
T.
Farsides. (2014, November 07). Empathy. Retrieved from http://tomfarsides.blogspot.com/2014/11/empathy.html
Wow what a great blog, i really enjoyed reading this, good luck in your work. Taxi Sacramento Airport to UC Davis
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