Deep reasons for superficial altruism

In earlier posts I suggested that we can use the word “altruism” to refer to the phenomenon of people being concerned about the positive welfare of others. In this post I argue for the importance of a distinction between having (‘superficial’) altruistic concerns and (‘deep’) reasons for such concerns.

Let’s start with some fine art:

Although not explicitly shown in the masterpiece above, Huey, Dewey, and Louie each want their Uncle Donald to be happy. Because of this, and also because they believe he will be happy if (and only if) they behave well during a forthcoming visit to the cinema, they are all keen to overcome their mischievous nature and to behave impeccably throughout the trip. To this extent, then, they each share at least a superficial altruistic desire (i.e., they want Donald to be happy) and a superficial altruistic motive (i.e., to behave well because they believe this will promote Donald’s positive welfare; in this case, his happiness).

How we recognise superficial altruism largely follows from what has been said already and is relatively straightforward. We can infer Huey, Dewey, and Louie’s superficial altruism towards Donald to the extent that they: (a) desire good things for him; (b) anticipate being pleased when (desired) things go well for Donald and dissatisfied when they do not; (c) act to try to promote his positive welfare (as they see it) when doing so seems necessary and sufficient to bring about the situation they seek (e.g., Donald’s happiness) and efficient (i.e., when doing this does not interfere with things they value more); and (d) derive satisfaction when they think that (valued) things have gone well for Donald and are displeased when they have not. The more confident we are that Huey, Dewey, and Louie have such desires, expectations, motives, and reactions, the more confident we can be in our judgements that they are superficially altruistic towards Donald.

The term “superficial” in this context does NOT mean “unimportant”. Huey, Dewey, and Louie are concerned about Donald’s positive welfare and they are motivated to promote it. These are manifestations of the phenomenon I am interested in and want to understand. Other things being equal, I would prefer Huey, Dewey, and Louie to desire and to take reasonable efforts to promote Donald’s positive welfare than to not care (i.e., to be indifferent) about it, or to desire and seek to make things worse for Donald (i.e., to be superficially aggressive). This means that I would be well advised to both recognise superficial altruism when I see it and try to understand where it comes from. Being able to identify it is essential if it is to be studied well. Understanding where it comes from is likely to enhance prediction and control of it.

Notwithstanding the fact that Huey, Dewey, and Louie genuinely do have concern for Donald’s positive welfare (i.e., they are superficially altruistic), they nevertheless have different reasons for that concern.

Huey loves and respects his uncle and is sad that Donald has been down in the dumps for so long. The love, respect, and compassion he has for Donald means that he would be delighted if Donald were to enjoy a happy spell. What Huey really and truly wants is for Donald to be happy and (other things being equal) Donald being happy would directly add to Huey’s own happiness. Thus, we might say that Huey is deeply altruistic towards Donald.¹ This deep altruism explains the reasons for Huey’s desires, intentions, and likely behaviour at the cinema, as well as his likely reactions to various possible events that eventually unfold there.

Dewey adores his mother, Della, and knows that she is worried sick about her brother, Donald. Dewey desires anything that he thinks will bring his mother happiness and is more than willing to do whatever it takes to bring this about. Dewey is sure that his mother will be delighted if Donald enjoys a happy spell. This is reason enough for Dewey to want Donald to be happy and to make efforts to bring this about. Thus, although Dewey does want Donald to be happy and is motivated to make him so, this is instrumental in service of what he really and truly (and deeply altruistically) wants: his mother’s happiness.

Louie loves nothing better than eating sweets. He particularly likes the pick-n-mix sold at the cinema. Louie knows that Donald likes to buy his nephews treats when he is happy – but only when he is happy. Louie’s passion for sweets is the main factor that needs to be grasped to understand why he intends to be well-behaved on the cinema trip. Thus, although Louie does want Donald to be happy and is motivated to make him so, this is instrumental to what he really and truly wants: happiness for his future self. Although his superficial altruism is real, deep down Louie is fundamentally self-interested; literally interested in the welfare of his imagined future ‘self’.

Understanding the deep reasons for it helps predict which changes in circumstances will affect superficial altruism, and why. Because Dewey’s real but superficial concern for Donald is contingent both on his love for his mother and his mother’s love for her brother, if Dewey falls out with his mother or she falls out with Donald, Dewey will have lost his (deep) reason to be (superficially) altruistic towards Donald. Similarly, if Louie goes off sweets or finds a better supplier than Donald, he too will have lost his (deep) reason to be (superficially) altruistic towards Donald. This is because Dewey and Louie’s concern for Donald’s welfare, while genuine, is not deep. Deep down, they care much more about other things that happen to lead them to care about Donald. This is not the situation for Huey. His superficial concern for Donald stems specifically from a deep concern for Donald. He cannot stop caring about Donald’s positive welfare without losing his love, respect, and compassion for Donald.

In the scenario above I have used “love, respect, and compassion” as an example (deep) reason for (superficial) altruism but it is important to recognise both that (a) this is actually a combination of possible reasons, each one of which alone might provide a deep reason for superficial altruism, and (b) there might be other deep reasons for superficial altruism not included in this bundle. I will say more about this elsewhere (including in “Final thoughts and further reading”, below).

In summary, to effectively identify, explain, and potentially control the phenomenon I am interested in, it is useful to distinguish between superficial altruism (versus superficial indifference and superficial aggression) and (various) deep reasons for that altruism.

Key points

Concern for the positive welfare of others (altruism) needs to be differentiated from a lack of concern for the welfare of others (indifference) and concern for the negative welfare of others (aggression).

This differentiation is best done at the ‘superficial’ level of whether or not people have such concerns.

There are various possible reasons for having ‘superficial’ concerns. For present purposes, reasons for superficial altruism differ mainly according to how directly perceived positive welfare of another brings satisfaction to altruists. Some reasons lead to a very close link between perceived positive other-welfare and altruists’ personal satisfaction. Other reasons mean that perceived positive other-welfare is the first step in a chain of events that may ultimately lead to satisfaction of other desires that are ultimately more important to superficial altruists.

Footnote

1.      Another phrase that is sometimes used to describe ‘deep’ altruism is to say that Huey is “directly” altruistic towards Donald (or similar). This is then contrasted with “instrumental” altruism, which is where Donald’s positive welfare is desired, appreciated (to some extent), and sometimes sought not as an end in its own right (sometimes called an “ultimate” end) but as a means to some other end which is what is ‘really’ desired (with Donald’s welfare being desired only because of its instrumental value towards this other ultimate end). I really don’t mind what terminology is used as long as it is used consistently and constructively. A problem with the terms mentioned in this footnote is that, sooner rather than later, someone will argue that “ultimately” people only seek things they want and that ‘therefore’ everyone is “really only self-interested” (or some such) and “there is no such thing as altruism”. Thus, Duey for example does not seek Donald’s happiness as an ultimate end in its own right but ‘actually’ seeks it only instrumentally because he (correctly) anticipates that it will contribute to his own happiness, therefore he is ‘really’ self-interested and ‘true’ altruism doesn’t exist. Such arguments quickly become tiresome. More importantly, they lead to incorrect conclusions. They lose the crucial distinctions between “superficial” altruism, indifference, and aggression; between different “deep reasons” for superficial altruism; and between these two levels or foci of investigation.

Activities that may enhance understanding

1.      Think about other (‘deep’) reasons for superficial altruism and draw pictures to represent them. How would you draw Stewie anticipating feeling guilty if he doesn’t cheer Donald up? What about Phooey who is a passionate Ducks’ Rights activist who will feel proud if he can improve the life of even one duck? Or Zooie who believes that her God is pleased whenever she makes any duck happy? Or Kookie who wants to have Donald as a loyal customer and is sure that this will be facilitated if she keeps him happy? And so on.

2.      Listen to the Radiolab episode The Rhino Hunter (http://www.radiolab.org/story/rhino-hunter/). By spending $350,000, Cory Knowlton won an opportunity to kill a black rhino – which he subsequently did. Black rhinos are magnificent beasts and an endangered species. To what extent is Cory superficially and deeply altruistic (and towards who or what)? What is your evidence? What further evidence might help you decide?

3.      Imagine that Huey, Dewy, and Louie want Donald dead and are willing to bring their wishes to fulfilment by joining in a hunt intended to kill him. Most people would be happy to call their desires, motives, and subsequent actions “aggressive”. Imagine now that Huey’s aggression stems from virulent hatred for Donald, that Dewey’s stems from a belief that Donald has a virus that makes him a potentially fatal threat to all who come into contact with him, and that Louie’s stems from a desire to earn the bounty that someone has put on Donald’s head. Do you now want to say that only Huey is ‘really’ aggressive towards Donald because Dewey is ‘really’ acting in service of his community and Louie is ‘really’ only acting in self-interest? How does your answer ‘fit’ with your intuitions about ‘real’ altruism?

Final thoughts and further reading

One possible (deep) reason for (superficial) altruism is thinking that morality requires one to promote the welfare of particular others. Peter Singer’s commitment to utilitarianism, for example, gives him a reason to care about improving the welfare of those who will most benefit from his help. Having this as his only reason for action severely curtails how able Singer is to consider other concerns morally defensible, e.g., concerns for himself or for others who are not among those who would most benefit from his help. For details, see:

Farsides, T. (2015, September 05). What is the most good you can do? The Psychologist. http://thepsychologist.bps.org.uk/what-most-good-you-can-do A review of Peter Singer’s The most good you can do: How effective altruism is changing ideas about living ethically.

Another possible (deep) reason for (superficial) altruism is identifying with an in-group. If the identification is extreme, people can come to prioritise the welfare of the group over all other concerns. Two references relevant to this are:

Everett, J. A., Faber, N. S., & Crockett, M. (2015). Preferences and beliefs in ingroup favoritism. Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 9, 15.

Swann, Jr., W. B., Gómez, Á., Buhrmester, M. D., López-Rodríguez, L., Jiménez, J., & Vázquez, A. (2014). Contemplating the ultimate sacrifice: Identity fusion channels pro-group affect, cognition, and moral decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 106(5), 713-727.

Probably the most studied (deep) reason for (superficial) altruism is having compassionate feelings for another in need. The best treatment of this I know is:

Goetz, J. L., Keltner, D., & Simon-Thomas, E. (2010). Compassion: An evolutionary analysis and empirical review. Psychological Bulletin, 136 (3), 351-374.

Another possible (deep) reason for (superficial) altruism is wanting to think of oneself as a loving or good person and thinking that this requires caring about the welfare of others. Two references relevant to this are:

Boegershausen, J., Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2015). Moral identity. Current Opinion in Psychology, doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2015.07.017

Colby, A., & Damon, W. (2010). Some do care. Simon and Schuster.

Image credits

Ducks: Original artwork

Animal skins from link

How to cite this blog post using APA Style

See: http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/10/

T Farsides. (2015, October 3). Deep reasons for superficial altruism. Retrieved from http://tomfarsides.blogspot.com/2015/10/deep-reasons-for-superficial-altruism.html 

Alternatives to Selfishness

I want to understand a phenomenon and it is important to me to be as clear as I can be about what that phenomenon is. Please allow me one more try.

Playing to my strengths, I shall make full use of my artistic talent...

I am the person on the left. The thought-bubble reveals that I have a concern. I want something nice to happen to someone or something. Specifically, I want something nice to happen to one of the people or things in the right-hand column.

I might want nice things for me and only for me.  If so, my concern will be literally and purely me-ish or, to use the more common term, self-ish. The object of my concern will be my self and only my self. Such concern will sometimes motivate me to try to pursue nice things for myself. In such circumstances, I will try to help myself.

I might instead want nice things for someone or something other than just myself. I might want nice things for you, or for a particular cat, or for my community, or for humanity, or for the poor, or for countless other potential beneficiaries. This is the phenomenon I want to understand: concern for the positive welfare of anyone or anything other than just the self. I want to understand concerns that are other-ish rather than purely and solely self-ish. And I want to understand when such concerns motivate attempts to help others.

That’s it! I want to understand people being concerned about the positive welfare of others, whether that concern is expressed in thought, feeling, and/or action.

This is the phenomenon I want to understand. I call it “altruism” and I think there are three good reasons for doing so. First, the word literally means other-ism, which highlights the central feature of the phenomenon I am interested in. Secondly, “altruism” allows useful comparisons with “selfishness” (with concerns only for one’s own welfare), “aggression” (with concerns for others’ negative welfare), and “indifference” (without concern). Thirdly, “altruism” is a word often used in ordinary discourse when discussing the phenomenon I seek to understand. This is most apparent when people claim its absence. When someone says, “X isn’t being altruistic” they mean that - perhaps despite appearances and claims to the contrary - X is not in fact concerned about somebody else’s positive welfare. 

“The map is not the territory” is a phrase sometimes used to remind people about the difference between things and the symbols used to represent those things. My interest is in a particular phenomenon and I use the word “altruism” to refer to that phenomenon. I don’t mind (too much) if other people use other words for the same thing or use the same word for other things, just as long as everyone is clear. Problems arise, though, when people focus on the map instead of the territory. When people insist that “altruism” is this or means that, they are often making claims about the territory based on their preferred maps rather than trying to choose or mark out an appropriate map after a close examination of the territory. Even this would be fine if the people doing it were careful, but often they are not.

People sometimes make claims like “organ donation is motivated by benevolence rather than altruism” (Ferguson et al., 2008) or that “empathy is more powerful than sympathy” (Matthews, 2013). Such assertive, fact-like claims would only make sense if the words used in them had fixed meanings that corresponded clearly to real-world phenomena. A cursory look at any relevant literature will make it blindingly obvious that this is not the case. Daniel Batson (2009), for example, differentiates eight commonly-used meanings of the word “empathy”. One of these is identical to what people usually mean when they use the word “sympathy” (Wispé, 1986). Given this, to say that “empathy is more powerful than sympathy” is almost nonsensical and it certainly risks being misleading. Ditto claiming that “organ donation is motivated by benevolence rather than altruism”. “Empathy”, “sympathy”, “benevolence” and of course “altruism” are “essentially contested concepts”. People will probably always disagree about how they should be used.

Many scholars approach “altruism” in this “the map dictates the territory” way. Such scholars will not like me calling the phenomenon I am interested in “altruism” because it does not have some or other condition that they think is essential to use the word “altruism” properly. Experience tells me that such people are usually best avoided if one is interested in understanding a phenomenon rather than getting waylaid by dubious claims about what particular words really mean.

To repeat, I am interested in the phenomenon of people being concerned about the positive welfare of others and I think “altruism” is at least as good a word as any for this phenomenon.

With sincere best wishes (please see the ‘diagram’ above if you need help interpreting this).

References/further reading

Batson, C.D. (2009). These things called empathy: Eight related but distinct phenomena. In J. Decety & W. Ickes (Eds.), The social neuroscience of empathy (pp. 3-15). Cambridge: MIT press.

Essentially contested concepts. (No date). Wikipedia. Link

Ferguson, E., Farrell, K., & Lawrence, C. (2008). Blood donation is an act of benevolence rather than altruism. Health Psychology, 27 (3), 327-336.

Map-territory relation. (No date). Wikipedia. Link

Matthews, C. (2013). Why empathy is more powerful than sympathy. Huffpost Healthy Living, Dec 12. Link 

Wispé, L. (1986). The distinction between sympathy and empathy: To call forth a concept, a word is needed. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 314-421.

How to cite this blog post using APA Style

See: http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/10/

T. Farsides. (2013, December 19). Alternatives to selfishness. Retrieved from http://tomfarsides.blogspot.com/2013/12/alternatives-to-selfishness.html

The Altruism Question: Yes or No?

Daniel Batson asks The Altruism Question.

We want to know if anyone ever, in any degree, transcends the bounds of self-benefit and helps out of genuine concern for the welfare of another (Batson, 1991, pp. 1-2).

Batson answers yes and his critics answer no. Despite scores of studies, no data has yet persuaded any of the main players in the debate to change their answer. Part of the reason for this is that ‘The’ Altruism Question is double-barrelled. It combines two questions that would better be asked separately. One asks if behaviour is ever motivated by concern for another’s (positive) welfare and the other asks if such action ever ‘transcends the bounds of self-benefit’.

In my previous post I suggested that it is useful to distinguish between the subject and the object of goal-directed behaviour. People seeking to help others are the subjects of their actions: they are the people who are trying to achieve something. The same is true of people attempting to harm others and of people deliberately seeking to benefit or to harm themselves. In each case, someone is trying to bring about a state of affairs they desire. They differ in what they are trying to do (e.g., to help or to harm) and in the objects of their goals (e.g., who they are trying to help or harm). I suggested that actions can be called altruistic to the extent that they seek other-benefit, just as actions can be called aggressive or prudent to the extent that they seek, respectively, other-harm or self-help. Altruistic action understood in this way is no more mysterious than any other goal-seeking behaviour.

Although it is very easy to get confused when thinking about “altruism”, “selfishness”, and related terms, I have never met anyone who seriously doubts that humans sometimes want nice things for other people and that such desires sometimes motivate attempts to bring those nice things about. There is certainly plentiful evidence that they do; much of it from Batson’s lab.

This answers one half of Batson’s Altruism Question. People do sometimes help because of genuine concern for the welfare of others.

The wording of The Altruism Question commits Batson to move from accepting that people sometimes seek to help others to concluding that, when they do this, they transcend the bounds of self-benefit. But that conclusion is no more justified than it would be after observing that people sometimes strive to harm others.  (The Altruism Question can be modified with ease into The Aggression Question. Try it!)

Batson’s critics feel constrained by the same logic but move in the opposite direction. They reason that people doing something they want to do must involve pursuing rather than transcending self-benefit. Therefore, they conclude, people never help others because of genuine concern for their welfare. All apparent altruism is really self-interest. Presumably, similar reasoning would require conclusions that people who seem aggressive are not ‘really’ trying to harm others but are instead ‘only’ doing what they want to do; pursuing self-benefit. On this account it seems that pursuing self-benefit is the only ‘real’ goal people can ever have.

Any attempt to understand concern for the (positive or negative) welfare of others is severely hampered if all goal-directed behaviour is characterised as being indiscriminately self-interested.

Besides severely hampering research into one of the most important phenomena on earth, the main problem with The Altruism Question being double-barrelled is that it invites unnoticed switching between different meanings of the phrase “self-benefit”.

Batson believes that people sometimes have goals to improve others’ welfare. Batson’s critics believe that motivation necessarily involves people pursuing personal interests. These are perfectly compatible positions. People are sometimes personally - sincerely, genuinely - interested in having a positive impact on others’ lives. Having a positive impact on others’ welfare is (at least part of) what people with altruistic goals want to do.

It is perfectly possible to assume that people are ultimately motivated by trying to achieve what they want to achieve (i.e., that they pursue personal-interests) but nevertheless insist that there can be important differences in what they want to achieve - which is sometimes but not always to have a positive influence on others’ welfare. People are sometimes altruistic just as they are sometimes aggressive. In each case, just as with any goal-directed behaviour, people are pursuing personal interests; pursuing what they want.

Related things can be said about people pursuing positive welfare for groups and about people striving to be moral or pious. Batson calls these pursuits examples of ‘collectivism’ and ‘principalism’, respectively, and asks whether they might involve additional forms of motivation distinct from both ‘egoism’ and ‘altruism’. That is, Batson essentially asks The Collectivism Question and The Principlism Question. He might as well also ask The Animal Welfare Question, The Killing Vermin Question, and any number of other Questions. Is it really constructive to question whether people ever (genuinely, really, sincerely, etc.) seek to help particular groups, harm particular groups, follow some principles, resist some principles, help particular animals, harm particular animals, serve science, maintain family honour, etc? Making such claims is only to say that people have and sometimes seek fulfilment of many, many different personal goals. No novel theory of motivation is required by realising any of this; any more than one is needed by accepting that people sometimes have sincere goals to help others.

It is vitally important to try to understand people caring about and pursuing (negative and positive) other-welfare. Progress towards such understanding is routinely hampered by scientists and scholars confusing themselves and others by over-complicating the nature of these activities.

Frustrating though it can be, there are other conceptual confusions which need to be addressed before the empirical literature relating to concern for the positive welfare of others can be appraised with a clear head. Next up: Does altruism require sacrifice?

Key points

‘The Altruism Question’ is doubled-barrelled and asks two distinct questions.

One part of ‘The Altruism Question’ asks if people ever act on goals to help others. The evidence that they do is similar to evidence that people act on myriad other goals they have.

The other part of ‘The Altruism Question’ asks if people ever transcend self-interest. They do to the extent that people sometimes have personal interests to pursue the perceived interests of others (as well as or rather than pursing interests for the ‘self’ – see previous post). They do not in the sense that people’s personal goals are, by definition, their own goals - even when those goals are to try to help others.

The conflation of distinct questions within ‘The Altruism Question’ leads to confusion, particularly around notions of “self-interest”. There is no tension involved in claiming that people sometimes seek to satisfy personal goals to help others.

A couple of key sources

Batson, C. D. (1991). The altruism question: Towards a social-psychological answer. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Batson, C. D. (1994). Why act for the public good? Four answers. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 603-610. Link

How to cite this blog post using APA Style

See: http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/10/

T. Farsides. (2013, October 14). The Altruism Question: Yes or no? Retrieved from http://tomfarsides.blogspot.com/2013/10/the-altruism-question-yes-or-no.html

Image credits

Bush-baby link

Compassionate intervention –No link! Sorry, I can’t remember or currently relocate where I copied this photo from. I will attribute the source as soon as I can find it again. 

Where's the "I" in altruism?

In my first post, I suggested that people sometimes do things because they want to have a positive impact on others’ lives. In my second, I suggested that when people do this, they, their goals, and their behaviour can be called altruistic. I suggested that this was no more contentious than a claim that when people seek to harm others, they, their goals, and their behaviour can be called aggressive.

Understood like this, altruism and aggression are goal-seeking. When altruistic or aggressive, people strive for outcomes that they think will be good or bad for others because that is what they want to achieve.

Grammatically, the altruist or aggressor is a subject whose immediate goal is to try to influence another’s welfare and the other’s welfare is the object of the altruist’s or aggressor’s desire and action. Semi-formally, in altruism a person (P) strives (s) to have a positive influence (↑) on another’s (O) welfare (w) (Ps ↑ Ow) and in aggression a person strives to have a negative influence (↓) on another’s welfare (Ps ↓ Ow).

As also mentioned in my second post, a person can strive to have an impact on his or her own welfare. Prudence, which involves a person striving to improve his or her own welfare, was given as an example. In prudence, the subject (P, the person who acts) is the same as in altruism or aggression. Only the object of their immediate desire and action is different. In prudence, a person strives to have a positive impact on the self’s welfare: Ps ↑ Sw.

Differentiating P and S helps keep clear the distinction between the subject and the object of goal-seeking action. When a person engages in altruism, aggression, prudence, or any other goal-seeking behaviour, the subject is the same; it is the person performing the action in order to pursue their goal. What differs across these behaviours is the object of that person’s immediate desire and action. In altruism and aggression the object is another; in prudence the object is the self.

Differentiating P and S is also useful in trying to keep separate two meanings of the slippery phrase “self-interest”.

Because they engage in goal-seeking behaviour, it is tempting to think of altruists as ultimately irredeemably “self-interested”. They are, after all, striving to achieve things they want and they presumably anticipate some sort of satisfaction if their goals are achieved. But because people pursuing any goal can be called “self-interested” in this sense, even if the immediate object of their desires and actions is not the self, perhaps the term “personal-interest” might be better here. People have all manner of goals or personal interests, only some of which have welfare of ‘the self’ as the immediate object of interest.

As well as being personally interested in the sense of having goals, the prudent are also self-interested in a much more direct way. Their personal interest is specifically to intentionally seek benefits for the self. The self’s welfare is the object of their immediate desires and actions. They have personal goals (“self-interest” #1) to promote their self’s welfare (“self-interest” #2).

People are also self-interested in this additional, intentional, direct sense when they seek to harm the self. For want of a better phrase, I shall call this “self-abuse”: Ps ↓ Sw. In prudence and self-abuse, people strive (and are therefore personally interested) to affect their own welfare (their self-interest). In altruism and aggression, people strive (and are therefore personally interested) to influence others’ welfare (other-interest). The table below illustrates these two different senses of “self-interest”.

                         

(Personal goal)            Goal object                 

Aggression      s↓         “Other-welfare”, i.e., harm to other

Altruism          s↑         “Other-welfare”, i.e., help for other

Prudence         s↑         “Self-welfare”, i.e., help for self

Self-abuse       s↓         “Self-welfare”, i.e., harm to self

In my nextpost I will review one of the most sustained programmes of empirical research in the psychology of altruism. I will suggest that it has been severely compromised by almost everyone involved apparently failing to adequately appreciate this essential difference between these two different uses of the phrase “self-interest”.

Key points

The subject of action is the same whenever a person engages in goal-directed behaviour: it is the person engaging in the behaviour to pursue those goals.

Goal-seeking behaviours are differentiated one from another by the object of the action, e.g., help for another (Ps ↑ Ow), help for the self (Ps ↑ Sw), harm to another (Ps ↓ Ow), or harm to the self (Ps ↓ Ow).

Final thoughts and further reading

In trying to keep things as clear as possible, I have not mentioned above a third sense of “self-interest”. This is the notion that some things are ‘objectively’ good for people’s welfare, i.e., ‘objectively in their (self-) interest’. It is possible to say, for example, that a person attempting to be prudent acts from ‘self-interest’ (i.e., pursues personal goals) when trying to promote their ‘self-interest’ (i.e., to improve their welfare as they see it) but ultimately does not act in their ‘self-interest’ (i.e., because alternative actions would have better promoted that person’s objective welfare). I do not believe it is in helpful to continue to use the phrase “self-interest” as promiscuously as some do, especially when trying to understand the phenomenon of people intentionally trying to help others.

Blackburn, S. (2001). Ethics: a very short introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Also published as Being Good).

Jensen, M. C. (1994). Self-interest, altruism, incentives, and agency theory. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 7 (2), 40-45.  [Link]

How to cite this blog post using APA Style

See: http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/10/

T. Farsides. (2013, October 7). Where’s the “I” in altruism? Retrieved from http://tomfarsides.blogspot.com/2013/10/wheres-i-in-altruism.html

Image credits

Dr. Who and Clara link

No such thing as altruism?

When I tell students about my course on The Psychology of Altruism and Helping, someone always announces that “There is no such thing as altruism.” When I ask them to explain, they say something like: “People are selfish. Everything they do, they do to pursue their own interests. Therefore there is no altruism. People never really care about others; only themselves.”

Delighted to encounter such passionately engaged students, I tell them it all depends on how the various key words are used – a claim they will get very used to hearing if they sign up for my course. I then suggest that we start our conversation somewhere other than by arguing about what words like selfish, self-interest, and altruism might mean.

I invite the student to start instead by thinking about the sorts of things that people do and why they do them.

Sometimes, I suggest, people do things because they want to have a positive impact on others’ lives. People with this goal do things like give blood, volunteer, comfort friends, donate to charity, buy Fair Trade goods, become organ donors, help strangers, and leave bathrooms as they would like to find them.

I invite the student to think about their own life. I ask if they have ever wanted to make things better for anyone else and whether they have ever acted on that impulse. I ask if any of their friends are nicer than others; more considerate, compassionate, and caring. Maybe I’m lucky in the students who show an interest in my course, because they keep saying “yes”.

At other times, I suggest, people do things for reasons other than wanting to improve others’ lives. Often without a thought for how such things might affect anyone else, people eat, watch films, drink, chat, and relocate traffic cones.

I invite the students to think again about their own lives. I ask them to identify times when they have done things without even thinking about whether or not their actions might be helpful for anyone else. They can always think of examples.

I then ask the students to consider whether there might be important differences between people doing things without considering the impact of those things on the welfare of others and people doing things because they want those things to have a positive impact on the welfare of others.  

I tell the students that I believe there are important differences between such behaviours and that I set up my Psychology of Altruism and Helping course as part of my attempt to understand the more other-considerate, other-serving ones.  I say I know that not everyone will agree that “altruism” is a good name for the behaviours I am interested in, and that people will claim that those behaviours are “not really altruistic” but, hey, they need a name! (In my next post I will start an argument that “altruism” is a good name for them.)

I then thank the students for their interest and wish them luck in finding a course that’s right for them. I bid them fare well and hope they have a good life.

Thank you for reading. Considerate questions and constructive comments are welcome.

Key Points

People sometimes do things because they want to have a positive impact on others’ lives.

When people do such things, they, their actions, their goals, and their desires can, to that extent, be called altruistic.

It is important to be able to identify and understand when people are and are not altruistic.

Final thoughts and further reading

Academics routinely confuse themselves and others with jargon. This is not trivial. It impedes knowledge, understanding, and progress.

Jingle-jangle fallacies. (No date). Wikipedia. Link

Rozin, P. (2001). Social psychology and science: Some lessons from Solomon Asch. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 2-14. Link

How to cite this blog post using APA Style

See: http://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/560/10/

T Farsides. (2013, September 23). No such thing as altruism? Retrieved from http://tomfarsides.blogspot.com/2013/09/no-such-thing-as-altruism.html

Image credits

Girl sharing ice lolly from link

Relocated traffic cone from link